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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20251015T160000
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DTSTAMP:20261013T090805Z
CREATED:20251009T092532Z
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UID:21097-1760544000-1760547600@i3-cnrs.fr
SUMMARY:Cerna Research seminar will welcome Nick de Roos (Liverpool)
DESCRIPTION:We are pleased to announce that Nick de Roos (Liverpool) will be the next speaker in our CERNA Research Seminar. The seminar will take place Wednesday\, October 15\, 2025 at 4 PM in Salle des Colonnes. \n\nNick will present his paper: \nNegotiating Coordination: A Study in Retail Gasoline \nSince antitrust laws prohibit direct communications between competitors\, firms often must infer from observed behavior in the marketplace how rivals will respond to various scenarios (and what rivals believe about how others will respond). A substantial theoretical and experimental literature has examined how agents facing strategic uncertainty reach equilibrium through complex interactive learning processes. However\, empirical research into the impacts of strategic uncertainty on firm behavior and market performance is virtually nonexistent. This paper studies the use of market prices in coordinating and renegotiating market outcomes absent direct communication. We examine a gradual\, sometimes disruptive\, equilibrium transition using a unique dataset of daily and hourly station-level prices from an urban gasoline market. Using an information-sharing platform to observe rivals’ prices\, the firms transition over seven years from coordinated focal pricing rules to a structure involving price leadership. Along the path\, firms appear to engage in various forms of experimentation\, signaling\, and manipulation (of rivals’ expectations) that strongly resemble behavior expected under strategic uncertainty. We observe recurrent deviations from focal pricing rules that entail substantial price undercutting and business stealing without immediate punishment. We also uncover a price war involving renegotiation\, punishments\, and resolution strictly through prices. Lastly\, we document how\, absent direct communication\, firms can actively modify their coordinated pricing structure to limit rivals’ incentives to deviate or undercut\, enabling greater long-run stability and higher prices. Overall\, our findings establish that prices can yield a sufficiently rich communication medium for implementing and renegotiating coordinated pricing structures\, but doing so requires firms to overcome significant strategic uncertainty. We discuss implications for theories of collusion and for policies aimed at detecting and prosecuting cartels. \n 
URL:https://i3-cnrs.fr/en/evenement/cerna-research-seminar-will-welcome-nick-de-roos-liverpool/
LOCATION:Mines Paris PSL\, 60 boulevard saint Michel\, Paris\, France
CATEGORIES:Seminaires
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